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CIVIL JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN 
EUROPE*
by P. Vlas, M. Zilinsky and F. Ibili**
1. INTRODUCTION
Since 1 March 2002 the EC Regulation No. 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) operates in legal practice. 
On 1 May 2004 the new EU Member States had to accept the ‘Brussels I’ 
Regulation as acquis communautaire.1 The Regulation is now in force in all EU 
Member States, with the exception of Denmark. As mentioned in the previous 
survey, it is the intention to conclude eventually a convention with Denmark in 
which the solutions reached under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation will be laid down. 
Then the necessary unity in the application of the rules of jurisdiction and of 
recognition and enforcement will be restored again. According to Article 68 
EC the EC Court of Justice can give preliminary rulings on the interpretation 
of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. Although the ﬁrst questions are put before the
ECJ,2 there is no decision as yet in which the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation has been 
interpreted. In one decision regarding the interpretation of Article 5(3) Brussels 
Convention concerning the forum delicti, the ECJ referred to the solutions 
reached under the same provision in the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. The Court 
decided that Article 5(3) Brussels Convention could also be used in case the 
harmful event might occur.3
The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments within the European 
Union is simpliﬁed by the introduction of the European Enforcement Order
for uncontested claims (Regulation No. 805/2004), which will be applicable as 
from 21 October 2005. This Regulation abolishes the exequatur for judgments 
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on uncontested claims, which have been certiﬁed as a European Enforcement
Order in the Member State of origin. Such a certiﬁed judgment will be recog-
nised and enforced in the other Member States without exequatur proceedings 
necessary. The European Enforcement Order certiﬁcate can only be issued if
certain minimum standards for uncontested claims procedures have been met 
(Arts. 12 to 19 of the Regulation). The European Enforcement Order is not 
compulsory, the creditor may choose recognition and enforcement by using the 
procedures according to the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation.4
Finally mention is to be made of the Lugano Convention, which was 
concluded on 16 September 1988 between the Member States of the European 
Community at that time and the Member States of the European Free Trade 
Association. The Lugano Convention is still of interest in the relationships 
between the former 15 Member States and Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. 
Plans are made for a new convention in which the solutions reached under the 
‘Brussels I’ Regulation will be laid down. Negotiations for this new instrument 
have not started yet, due to the fact that the European Council asked the ECJ for 
a decision regarding the question whether or not the Community has exclusive 
competence in this respect. 
2. ARTICLE 1 BRUSSELS CONVENTION: MATERIAL SCOPE
Article 1 Brussels Convention deals with the Convention’s material scope. 
Article 1 of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation deals with the same matter and does 
not give any material changes. Both instruments shall apply in civil and 
commercial matters and shall not extend to revenue, customs or administrative 
matters. Furthermore, some topics are explicitly excluded from the scope of 
the Brussels Convention as well as from the scope of the ‘Brussels I’ Regula-
tion. These matters relate to family law issues, insolvency, social security and 
arbitration. The notion ‘civil and commercial matters’ has to be interpreted in 
an autonomous way. The ECJ decided in one of its ﬁrst preliminary rulings on
the interpretation of the Brussels Convention that this notion must be regarded 
as independent and must be interpreted by reference, ﬁrst, to the objectives
and scheme of the Convention and, secondly, to the general principles which 
stem from the corpus of the national legal systems. According to the Court a 
judgment given in an action between a public authority and a person governed 
by private law, in which the public authority has acted in the exercise of its 
powers, is excluded from the area of application of the Convention (Case 29/76, 
LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG v. Eurocontrol, [1976] ECR 
1541, NILR 1978 80). This is settled case-law, as can be learned from two other 
preliminary rulings discussed below: Case C-271/00, Steenbergen v. Baten, 
4. See on this subject M. Zilinsky, De Europese Executoriale Titel [The European Enforce-
ment Order], PhD-thesis Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Deventer, Kluwer 2005). 
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[2002] ECR I-104895 and Case C-266/01, Préservatrice foncière TIARD SA v. 
Staat der Nederlanden, [2003] ECR I-4867.6
In Steenbergen v. Baten the Dutch municipality of Steenbergen sought 
recovery from Mr Baten (living in Belgium) for the social assistance under 
the Dutch Algemene Bijstandswet (Law on General Assistance) paid to the 
former wife of Mr Baten and her child. The marriage between Mr Baten and 
his wife was dissolved by a divorce decree by a Belgian court. In an agreement 
prior to the divorce the spouses agreed that no maintenance would be payable 
as between themselves and that Mr Baten would pay BF 3000 per month by 
way of contribution to the maintenance of the infant child of the marriage. The 
Dutch District Court of Breda ordered Mr Baten to pay to the municipality of 
Steenbergen the amounts granted to his former wife and her child by way of 
social assistance. In Belgium the question arose whether this judgment falls 
outside the material scope of the Convention. The Court of Appeal of Antwerp 
decided to ask the ECJ for a preliminary ruling whether the legal action of the 
municipality is a civil matter within the meaning of Article 1 Brussels Conven-
tion, and if so, whether this legal action is a case relating to social security and, 
therefore, falls outside the Convention’s scope.
The ECJ reiterated its settled case-law, that there is no civil and commer-
cial matter within the meaning of Article 1 Brussels Convention, if a public 
authority is acting in the exercise of its public powers. In the present case the 
Court distinguished between a legal action for the recovery of sums paid by 
the municipality by way of social assistance to the former spouse and her child 
and a legal action by a Dutch public body for payment of amounts of social 
assistance, disregarding an agreement between the spouses or former spouses in 
which they agreed that no maintenance would be payable between themselves. 
In the ﬁrst situation, the public body acts on the basis of rules of civil law (see
consideration 32) and therefore this action falls within the Convention’s scope, 
where in the second case the public body is placed in a situation which dero-
gates from the ordinary law. The Court held:
‘1. The first paragraph of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted 
as meaning that the concept of civil matters encompasses an action under a right 
of recourse whereby a public body seeks from a person governed by private law 
recovery of sums paid by way of social assistance to the divorced spouse and the 
child of that person, provided that the basis and the detailed rules relating to the 
bringing of that action are governed by the rules of the ordinary law in regard to 
maintenance obligations. Where the action under a right of recourse is founded on 
provisions by which the legislature conferred on the public body a prerogative of 
its own, that action cannot be regarded as being brought in civil matters.
2. Point 3 of the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Brussels Convention must 
5. NJ 2003 598 note Vlas.
6. See also IPRax 2003 512 note Geimer, Clunet 2004 646 note Bischoff, NJ 2005 65 note 
Vlas.
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be interpreted as meaning that the concept of social security does not encompass 
the action under a right of recourse by which a public body seeks from a person 
governed by private law recovery in accordance with the rules of the ordinary law 
of sums paid by it by way of social assistance to the divorced spouse and the child 
of that person.’ 
It follows from this decision, that the legal action of the municipality for 
recovery of the amounts of social assistance paid for the child falls within the 
Convention’s scope, but the legal action for recovery of the amounts paid to the 
former wife does not. Regarding the latter, enforcement should take place under 
the national rules of the State sought. With respect to the former claim, the ques-
tion arises on what ground the Dutch court could have based its jurisdiction. In 
the present case Article 2 of the Brussels Convention gives jurisdiction to the 
Belgian courts, because Mr Baten had his domicile (within the meaning of Art. 
52 of the Brussels Convention) in Belgium. Could Article 5(2) then be applied? 
In this Article jurisdiction is given in matters of maintenance to the courts for 
the place where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or habitually resident. 
The question is whether the Dutch municipality can be regarded as maintenance 
creditor. In another decision the ECJ ruled that Article 5(2) ‘cannot be relied on 
by a public body which seeks, in an action for recovery, reimbursement of sums 
paid under public law by way of an education grant to a maintenance creditor, to 
whose rights it is subrogated against the maintenance creditor’ (Case C-433/01, 
Freistaat Bayern v. Jan Blijdenstein, not yet published in ECR).7 Hence, a legal 
action of a municipality for the recovery of amounts of legal assistance cannot 
be based on Article 5(2) of the Brussels Convention.
In the decision Préservatrice foncière TIARD v. Staat der Nederlanden the 
question arose whether the notion ‘civil and commercial matters’ covers a claim 
by which a contracting State seeks to enforce against a person governed by 
private law a private-law guarantee contract which was concluded in order to 
enable a third person to supply a guarantee required and deﬁned by that State.
The Netherlands State claimed payment by a French insurance company on the 
basis of the guarantee commitments vis-à-vis the State of import and export 
duties owed by the authorised Netherlands associations under the Customs 
Convention on international transport of goods under cover of TIR-carnets of 
14 November 1975. Again the ECJ reiterated its case-law regarding the inter-
pretation of the notion ‘civil and commercial matters’. Is the Netherlands State 
in the present case exercising its public powers? The Court considered that it 
is necessary to identify the legal relationship between the parties to the dispute 
and to examine the basis and the detailed rules governing the bringing of the 
action. It is interesting that the Court gives some sort of autonomous deﬁnition
of a guarantee contract (consideration 27), derived from the general principles 
which stem from the legal systems of the contracting States. The Court deﬁnes
7. See also Rev. Crit. 2004 165 note Pataut, Clunet 2004 635 note Huet.
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a guarantee contract as a contract which ‘represents a triangular process, by 
which the guarantor gives an undertaking to the creditor that he will fulﬁl the
obligations assumed by the principle debtor if the debtor fails to fulﬁl them
himself’. According to the Court it is necessary to examine whether the legal 
relationship between the Netherlands State and the French insurance company, 
under the guarantee contract, is characterised by an exercise of public powers 
on the part of the State to which the debt is owed, in that it entails the exercise 
of powers going beyond those exercising under the rules applicable to relations 
between private individuals (consideration 30). Although it is for the national 
court to make that assessment, the ECJ provides some guidelines as to the 
factors which could be taken into consideration. Firstly, the TIR Convention 
does not govern the relationship between the Netherlands State and the French 
insurance company. Secondly, the undertaking of the French company vis-à-vis 
the Netherlands State was freely given and, ﬁnally, regard is to be had to the
terms of the guarantee contract. In our opinion it is obvious that these factors 
will lead to the conclusion that the action of the State relates to a private-law 
guarantee contract, that falls within the Convention’s material scope. In order 
to determine whether an action falls within that scope, only the subject-matter 
of the action must be taken into account. If the action of the Netherlands State 
falls within the Convention’s scope, the fact that the guarantee may raise pleas 
in defence relating to whether the guaranteed debt is owed, based on matters 
excluded from the scope of the Brussels Convention, has no bearing on whether 
the action itself is included in the Convention’s scope. The decision is in confor-
mity with previous case-law (Case C-190/89, Rich v. Impianti, [1991] ECR 
I-3855, NILR 1992 385 note Vlas) and with a decision on the interpretation 
of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention (Case C-111/01, Gantner v. Basch, 
[2003] ECR I-4207, see infra para. 6).
3. ARTICLE 5(1) BRUSSELS CONVENTION: FORUM  
 CONTRACTUS
With the transformation of the Brussels Convention into the ‘Brussels I’ Regu-
lation, signiﬁcant amendments have been brought in Article 5 with regard to the
jurisdiction in matters relating to contracts (forum contractus). Derogating from 
the principal rule of Article 2, Article 5(1) gives a special ground for jurisdic-
tion. A person domiciled in a Member State may, in another Member State, be 
sued, in matters relating to a contract in the courts for the place of performance 
of the obligation in question. This forum contractus is justiﬁed because of the
close connection between the dispute and the court seised. The court of the 
place of performance will generally be the most appropriate court for settling 
the case, in particular on the grounds of proximity and ease of taking evidence. 
The forum contractus provided in Article 5(1)(a) of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation 
corresponds to Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, so the case-law of the 
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ECJ with regard to the latter – including the decisions discussed below – there-
fore will remain relevant under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. Generally speaking, 
the place of performance shall, if the obligation in question is not performed 
and by absence of an agreement by the parties about the place of performance, 
be determined by the law which governs the obligation in question according 
to the conﬂict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought (Case
12/76, Tessili v. Dunlop, [1976] ECR 1473, NILR 1976 349, conﬁrmed in Case
C-440/97, Groupe Concorde v. The Master of the vessel Suhadiwarno Panjan, 
[1999] ECR 6307, NILR 2002 109 note Zilinsky). 
On the interpretation of the place of performance of the obligation in 
question in the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, two impor-
tant preliminary rulings of the EC Court were rendered since the last survey in 
this Review. Firstly, Case C-256/00, Besix SA v. Wasserreinigungsbau Alfred 
Kretzschmar GmBH & Co. KG/Planungs- und Forschungsgesellschaft Dipl. 
Ing. W. Kretzschmar GmbH & Co. KG, [2002] ECR I-1699 must be noted.8 The 
main question in this case is how to determine the place of performance within 
the meaning of Article 5(1) in case of a negative obligation, i.e., an obligation 
not to do something. This question raised after a dispute in reference to a claim 
for damages from Besix (Belgium) against WABAG/Plafog (Germany). Besix 
alleged that WABAG/Plafog breached an exclusivity clause in their contract. 
WABAG and Besix contractually agreed to submit a joint tender in response to 
a public invitation to render for a project of the Ministry of Mines and Energy 
of Cameroon and, as it would come so far, to perform the contract together. 
The two parties agreed to act exclusively and not to commit themselves to other 
partners (exclusivity and non-competition). However, it turned out that Plafog 
– WABAG and Plafog are both part of the Deutsche Babcock group – had also 
undertaken in this tender. Hereupon Besix brought an action in damages against 
WABAG and Plafog before the Belgian courts, alleging the Belgian courts to 
be the forum contractus. In appeal the Court of Appeal in Brussels referred the 
following question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling: 
‘Must Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention be interpreted as meaning that a 
defendant domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be 
sued, in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for any of the places of perfor-
mance of the obligation in question, in particular where, consisting in an obligation 
not to do something – such as, in the present case, an undertaking to act exclusively 
with another party to a contract with a view to submitting a joint bid for a public 
contract and not to enter into a commitment with another partner – that obligation 
is to be performed in any place whatever in the world?
If not, may that defendant be sued specifically in the courts for one of the places 
of performance of the obligation and, if so, by reference to what criterion must 
that place be determined?’
8. See also Rev. Crit. 2002 588 note Gaudemet-Tallon, NJ 2004 159 note Vlas.
NILR_2005-1-30a.indd   114 4/14/2005   3:55:08 PM
CIVIL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 115NILR 2005
In this case the obligation in question within the meaning of Article 5(1) is one 
not to do something, i.e., the obligation of parties to act exclusively and not to 
commit themselves to other partners. The parties intended to give no geograph-
ical limit to this negative obligation, so it should be performed all over the 
world. Does this mean that Article 5(1) confers jurisdiction on all the courts of 
the Member States where the obligation has to be performed? The ECJ empha-
sized that the principle of legal certainty is one of the objectives of the Brussels 
Convention. This principle requires that the jurisdictional rules which derogates 
from the principal rule of Article 2, like the forum contractus of Article 5(1), 
must be interpreted in such a way as to enable a normally well-informed defen-
dant reasonably to foresee before which courts, others than those of the State in 
which he is domiciled, he may be sued. As multiplicity of places of performance 
results in multiple competent fora contractus, it decreases the predictability of 
the competent court and therefore conﬂicts with the principle of legal certainty.
Furthermore, it is essential to avoid a situation in which multiple courts have 
jurisdiction with regard to one and the same contract in order to prevent incon-
sistent decisions. For these reasons, if the relevant obligation has been or is 
to be performed in a multitude of places, jurisdiction can not be conferred on 
each court of the Member State where the place of performance can be located. 
Otherwise the claimant would ﬁnd itself in the position to bring the case before
the court of the place of performance in which he expects a favourable decision, 
while the defendant ﬁnd itself in no position to reasonably foresee in which
courts – besides the court of his domicile – he may be sued. Therefore the ECJ 
held: 
‘Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention is not applicable where, as in the present 
case, the place of performance of the obligation in question can not be determined 
because it consists in an undertaking not to do something which is not subject to 
any geographical limit and is therefore characterised by a multiplicity of places 
for its performance. In such case, jurisdiction can be determined only by applica-
tion of the general criterion laid down in the first paragraph of Article 2 of the 
Convention.’
Another interesting preliminary ruling of the EC Court, relevant to the present 
discussion, is Case C-334/00, Fonderie Ofﬁcine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. 
Heinrich Wagner Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, [2002] ECR I-7357.9 This 
preliminary ruling relates to the question whether an action as a result of pre-
contractual liability falls within the scope of Article 5(1) or Article 5(3). The 
extensive opinion of Advocate-General Geelhoed before this preliminary 
ruling shows that in the substantive law of the Contracting States pre-contrac-
tual liability can be qualiﬁed both as (quasi-)contract or as tort or (quasi-)tort.
With this ruling the long-standing question whether an action founded on pre-
9. See also IPRax 2003 127 note Mankowski, Clunet 2003 668 note Huet, NJ 2003 46 note 
Vlas. 
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contractual liability as result of the unlawfully breaking off of negotiations falls 
within the scope of the forum contractus (Art. 5(1)) or the forum delicti (Art. 
5(3)) ﬁnally seems to been settled. What was the case? Tacconi (Italy) sued
WHS (Germany) before the Italian courts seeking to establish pre-contractual 
liability in reference to the unlawfully breaking off of negotiations for the sale 
of a moulding plant. The Italian Supreme Court (Corte suprema di cassazione) 
referred the following questions to the EC Court for a preliminary ruling: 
‘1. Does an action against a defendant seeking to establish pre-contractual liability 
fall within the scope of matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict (Article 5(3) 
of the Brussels Convention)?
2. If not, does it fall within the scope of matters relating to a contract (Article 5(1) 
of the Brussels Convention), and if it does, what is the obligation in question?
3. If not, is the general criterion of the domicile of the defendant the only criterion 
applicable?’ 
The EC Court repeated that the expressions ‘matters relating to a contract’ and 
‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ in Articles 5(1) and 5(3) have to 
be interpreted autonomously and do not imply a simple reference to the national 
laws of the Contracting States. In earlier preliminary rulings the EC Court held 
that ‘matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict’ covers all actions which seek 
to establish the liability of a defendant and which are not related to a contract 
within the meaning of Article 5(1) (see Case 51/97, Réunion Européenne SA v. 
Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV, [1998] ECR I-6511, NILR 2002 115 note 
Vlas). In the present case the EC Court stressed that the expression ‘matters 
relating to a contract’ is not to be understood as covering a situation in which 
there is no obligation freely assumed by one party towards another.10 There 
was clearly no obligation freely assumed by HWS towards Tacconi, so the 
obligation to compensate the damage caused by the unlawfully breaking off of 
negotiations can derive only from breach of rules of law (in particular the rule 
which requires the parties to act in good faith in negotiations with a view to the 
formation of a contract). The ECJ held: 
‘In the light of all the foregoing, the answer to the first question must be that, in 
circumstances such as those of the main proceedings, characterised by the absence 
of obligations freely assumed by one party towards another on the occasion of 
negotiations with a view to the formation of a contract and by a possible breach 
of rules of law, in particular the rule which requires the parties to act in good 
10. However, consideration 22 of the preliminary ruling states: ‘Moreover, while Article 5(1) 
of the Brussels Convention does not require a contract to have been concluded, it is neverthe-
less essential, for that provision to apply, to identify an obligation, since the jurisdiction of the 
national court is determined, in matters relating to a contract, by the place of performance of 
the obligation in question.’ This shows that the conclusion of a contract is not necessary for the 
application of Art. 5(1), but only an obligation is required. At this, one could possibly think of 
a ‘letter of intent’.
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faith in such negotiations, an action founded on the pre-contractual liability of the 
defendant is a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict within the meaning of 
Article 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.’11 
As mentioned before, Article 5(1)(a) of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation corresponds 
to Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention, so both preliminary decisions main-
tain relevant for the interpretation of Article 5(1)(a) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. 
However, there is one important difference between both provisions. Article 
5(1)(b) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation autonomously deﬁnes the place of performance
of the obligation in question as mentioned in Article 5(1)(a) for contracts 
concerning the sale of goods and the provision of services. Article 5(1)(b) reads 
as follows: 
‘for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of perfor-
mance of the obligation in question shall be:
– in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a Member State where, under the 
contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered,
– in the case of the provision of services, the place in a Member State where, under 
the contract the services were provided or should have been provided …’12
An advantage of this provision is the concentration of all disputes before one 
court. All disputes arising from the sale of goods, irrespective whether the 
dispute concerns the delivery of the goods or the payment, shall be brought for 
the courts in a Member State where the goods were delivered or should have 
been delivered. So, when the goods are actually delivered in a Member State, 
the courts of that State have jurisdiction in matters concerning both the delivery 
and payment.13 If Article 5(1)(b) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation points to the court 
of a non-Member State, this provision does not apply. In this case paragraph 
(c) refers to Article 5(1)(a) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation. When the goods are not 
delivered, but parties have concluded an agreement on the place of delivery, the 
courts of that particular Member State have jurisdiction in matters concerning 
both the delivery and payment. When the dispute concerns payment and parties 
contractually agreed on the place of payment, regularly payment at a bank 
account, Article 5(1)(b) confers jurisdiction on the court of the Member State 
of the agreed place of payment. Any dispute concerning the delivery shall be 
11. See for the application of this preliminary ruling in Dutch courts, e.g., District Court 
Rotterdam 24 September 2003, NIPR 2004 159. 
12. See for Dutch case law on this article, e.g., District Court Utrecht 15 October 2003, 
NIPR 2003 297, President District Court Alkmaar 7 August 2003, NIPR 2003, 281 and District 
Court Arnhem 5 September 2002, NIPR 2003 49.
13. Cf., the incorrect decision of District Court Almelo 4 June 2003, NIPR 2003 206. Accord-
ing to this Dutch court Art. 5(1)(b) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation does not regulate the situation that 
delivery actually has been made but parties did not contractually agree on a place of delivery. 
The court applied Art. 5(1)(a) and, considered the place where the actual delivery has been made 
as essential for the forum contractus-based jurisdiction. 
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brought before the courts in a Member State where the goods were delivered or 
should have been delivered. The foregoing also applies mutatis mutandis for the 
provision of services.
Complications arise when parties did not agree on neither the place of perfor-
mance nor the place of payment and no delivery has been made. In which way 
should the phrase ‘the place in a Member State where, under the contract, the 
goods … should have been delivered’ be interpreted? There are two possible 
solutions. Firstly, the phrase ‘under the contract’ means the place of delivery 
on which parties agreed. If parties have not made an agreement on the place 
of delivery, Article 5(1)(b) does not apply and Article 5(1)(a) applies by virtue 
of paragraph (c).14 The place of performance shall then be determined by the 
law governing the obligation in question according to the conﬂict of laws of
the court seised. There is no concentration of disputes under Article 5(1)(a) 
‘Brussels I’ Regulation and thus the competent court with regard to the delivery 
and the payment should be determined separately.15 Second, the phrase ‘under 
the contract’ is interpreted in such a way that in case of lack of any agreement 
on delivery, the place where the goods should have been delivered should be 
determined according to the Tessili-method, i.e., by the law governing the obli-
gation in question according to the conﬂict of laws of the court seised.16 The 
advantage of this view is the occurrence of concentration of disputes.
At this stage of the case-law of the ECJ it cannot be said that the forum 
contractus of Article 5(1) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation satisﬁes the requirement of
the principle of legal certainty: it is hard to imagine that this provision enables 
a normally well-informed defendant reasonably to foresee before which courts, 
other than those of the State in which he is domiciled, he may be sued. Let us 
hope that the ECJ shall, within a reasonable time, bring clarity in this respect.
4. ARTICLE 5(1) BRUSSELS CONVENTION: FORUM LABORIS
According to Article 5(1) Brussels Convention, in matters relating to individual 
contracts of employment, the place of performance of the obligation in ques-
tion is that where the employee habitually carries out his work. If the employee 
does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, the employer may 
also be sued in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the 
employee was or is now situated. The forum laboris is justiﬁed because of
the existence of a close relationship between the dispute and the court, and 
14. See accordingly District Court Arnhem 14 May 2003, NIPR 2003 289.
15. In favour of this interpretation J.J. van Haersholte-van Hof, NTER 2001, p. 246 and prob-
ably also L. Strikwerda, Inleiding tot het Nederlandse internationaal privaatrecht [Introduction 
to Netherlands Private International Law], 7th edn. (Deventer, Kluwer 2002) no. 237.
16. As expressed by G.E. Schmidt, NIPR 2001, p. 155 and P. Vlas, WPNR (2002) 6485, 
p. 302 (cf., WPNR (2000) 6421).
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is inspired by the thought to afford proper protection to the employee as the 
weaker contracting party. The ECJ frequently gave preliminary rulings on the 
interpretation of Article 5(1) in cases in which the employee performed his 
work in more than one Contracting State. Recently this question occurred in 
Case C-37/00, Herbert Weber v. Universal Ogden Services Ltd, [2002] ECR 
I-2013.17 Weber (Germany) worked for Universal Ogden Services (UK) as a 
cook on board of a ﬂoating crane in Danish territorial waters and on mining
vessels or installations in the Netherlands continental shelf area. In a dispute 
arisen between the parties about the agreement of employment the Dutch 
Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) referred to the EC Court for a preliminary ruling. 
The ﬁrst question is whether the work carried out by Weber on the Nether-
lands section of the Continental Shelf under the North Sea can be regarded as 
work carried out in the Netherlands, as a Contracting State, in the meaning of 
Article 5(1). The EC Court answered positively upon this by referring to the 
Convention on the Continental Shelf (Geneva, 29 April 1958). Consequently 
the second question arises in which of the two Contracting States Weber habitu-
ally carried out his work. In earlier case-law the EC Court stated that in such 
circumstances the place of performance is the place where or from which the 
employee principally discharges his obligation towards his employer (Case 
C-125/92, Mulox IBC v. Hendrick Geels, [1993] ECR I-4075, NILR 1994 344 
note Vlas), or the place where he has established the effective centre of his 
working activities (Case C-383/95, Petrus Wilhelmus Rutten v. Cross Medical, 
[1997] ECR I-57, NILR 1999 94 note Vlas). Hereby one must take into account 
the fact that the employee has an ofﬁce from which he works and organises
his work and to which he returns after each business trip abroad. In the present 
case the EC Court ﬁnds in principal decisive the temporal criterion of the
place where the employee spends most of his working time fulﬁlling his duties
towards his employer. Because Weber continuously performed the same job as 
cook for the whole period of employment, any qualitative criteria relating to 
the nature and importance of the work in various Contracting States are irrel-
evant. The implication of this temporal criterion is that all of an employee’s 
term of employment must be taken into account in determining the place where 
he carries out the most signiﬁcant part of his work. Only if the subject matter
of the dispute were more closely connected with a different place of work, 
the abovementioned principle would fail to apply. For example, weight will 
be given to the most recent period of work where the employee, after having 
worked for a certain time in one place, then works on a permanent basis in a 
different place, since the parties clearly intended the latter place to become a 
new habitual place of work. If these criteria does not enable the national court 
to determine the habitual place of work, because there are two or more places of 
work of equal importance or none of the places where the employee carries out 
his work has a sufﬁcient permanent and close connection with the work done,
17. See also IPRax 2003 21 note Mankowski, Clunet 2003 661 note Huet. 
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then the employee may sue his employer before the courts for the place where 
the business which engaged him is situated (Art. 5(1)) or before the courts on 
whose territory the employer is domiciled (Art. 2).
In Case C-437/00, Giulia Pugliese v. Finmeccanica SpA, Alenia Aerospazia 
Division, [2003] ECR I-3573, another question arose concerning the localization 
of the place of performance with reference to an individual contract of employ-
ment. In a dispute between Pugliese and her in Italy established employer 
Finmeccanica, the German Landesarbeitsgericht München referred to the EC 
Court, among others, the following question for a preliminary ruling: 
‘In a dispute between an Italian national and a company established under Italian 
law having its registered office in Italy arising from a contract of employment 
concluded between them which designates Turin as the place of work, is Munich 
the place where the employee habitually carried out his work under the second 
part of Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention where, from the outset, the contract 
of employment is temporarily placed on non-active status at the request of the 
employee and, during that period, the employee carries out work, with the consent 
of the Italian employer, but on the basis of a separate contract of employment, for 
a company established under German law at its registered office in Munich, for the 
duration of which the Italian employer assumes the obligation to provide accom-
modation in Munich or to bear the costs of such accommodation and to bear the 
costs of two journeys home each year?’
The question is whether in a dispute between an employee and a ﬁrst employer
the place where the employee performs his obligations to the second employer 
may be regarded as the place where he habitually carries out his work under 
the contract with the ﬁrst employer in the meaning of Article 5(1)? The ECJ
considered as follows. When an employee has two different employers, the ﬁrst
employer can be sued before the courts of the place where the employee carries 
out his work for the second employer only when, at the time of the conclusion 
of the second contract of employment, the ﬁrst employer has an interest in the
employees performance of the work for the second employer in a place decided 
by the latter. The existence of this interest must be determined by taking into 
consideration all facts of the case. The relevant factors may include the fact 
that the conclusion of the second contract was envisaged when the ﬁrst was
being concluded, the fact that the ﬁrst contract was amended on account of the
conclusion of the second contract, the fact that there is an organic or economic 
link between the two employers, the fact that there is an agreement between the 
two employers providing a framework for the coexistence of the two contracts, 
the fact that the ﬁrst employer retains management powers in respect of the
employee and the fact that the ﬁrst employer is able to decide the duration of
the employee’s work for the second employer (consideration 24). 
Under the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation jurisdiction in matters relating to indi-
vidual contracts of employment is no longer determined by Article 5(1), but 
by Articles 18 to 21. There is one major difference in comparison with the 
Brussels Convention. While under Article 5(1) of the Brussels Convention both 
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the employee and employer can bring a dispute before the courts of the place 
where the employee habitually carries out his work, Article 18(2)(1) of the 
‘Brussels I’ Regulation explicitly restricts this possibility for the employee. The 
result of this is that under the Regulation an employer may bring proceedings 
– apart from any possible jurisdiction clause – only in the courts of the Member 
State in which his employer is domiciled (Article 20(1) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation). 
This modiﬁcation has met much criticism, as appeared from the questions from
the European Parliament18 and a Dutch proposal to amend Article 20(1) EC 
Regulation.19 The Commission reported that ‘[t]he provisions on the contract 
of employment have been amended with the speciﬁc purpose of protecting the
weaker party by means of rules of jurisdiction which are more favourable to his 
interests than the general rules which would have tended to favour a tribunal 
closer to the employer’, and that it is not intended to propose an amendment of 
Article 20(1) ‘Brussels I’ Regulation at this moment.20 
5. CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
Articles 13 to 15 Brussels Convention (Arts. 15 to 17 ‘Brussels I’ Regula-
tion) deal with matters of consumer contracts. Generally speaking, consumer 
protection is based on the idea of protecting the economically weaker party (the 
consumer) and on considerations of economic, monetary and savings policy. 
These are also the objectives of Articles 13 to 15 Brussels Convention. Juris-
diction in proceedings concerning a consumer contract is determined by these 
Articles, if the contract is a contract for sale of goods on instalment credit terms, 
or a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or any other form of credit. 
Also any other contract for the supply of goods or a contract for the supply 
of services falls within the ambit of these provisions, if the conclusion of the 
contract was preceded by a speciﬁc invitation to the consumer or by advertising
in the State of his domicile and the consumer took in the State of his domicile 
the steps necessary for the conclusion of the contract. It is to be mentioned 
that in accordance with Article 15 of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation it is no longer 
necessary that the consumer takes all necessary steps for the conclusion of the 
18. Written question E-0785/02 by Bartho Pronk, Ria Oomen-Ruijten and Toine Manders, 
OJ C 309E/47, 12 December 2002. See for similar questions in Dutch Parliament Aanhangsel 
Handelingen II 2001/2002, no. 977.
19. The Dutch proposal (JUSTCIV 133, 12055/02, 19 September 2002) reads as follows: 
para. 2 of Art. 20 of the EC Regulation will be renumbered to para. 3, and a new paragraph 
will added, reading: ‘The claim of the employee for the dissolution of the labour contract can 
also be brought in the court of the place in which the employer habitually carries out his work 
or, when the employee does not habitually carries out his work in one state, in the courts before 
the place where the business which engaged the employee is situated.’
20. Answer from Vitorino, on behalf of the Commission, OJ C 309E/47, 12 December 
2002.
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contract in the Member State where he or she is domiciled. However, the activi-
ties of the professional co-contractor are still to be directed to the Member State 
where the consumer is domiciled.
In the case-law of the ECJ the question has arisen if for the applicability of 
Article 13 Brussels Convention it is necessary that the consumer contract is 
already concluded. In the Gabriel ruling (Case C-96/00, [2002] ECR I-6367)21 
Mr Gabriel received on his private address in Austria a personalised letter from 
a mail-order company. This company is established under the German law and 
has its registered ofﬁce in Germany. According to this letter Mr Gabriel won
a certain prize of money. This promised prize were to be paid to him if he had 
placed an order for goods in the company’s catalogue. After having placed an 
order and after having received the ordered goods the promised beneﬁt was not
send to him. Mr Gabriel decided to institute proceedings against the German 
mail-order company in Austria under Article 14 of the Brussels Convention. 
In a procedure to determine the territorial jurisdiction of the Austrian court, 
the question has arisen whether these proceedings were of a contractual nature 
or relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, as there was no completed contract 
between parties on the promised beneﬁt.
The Brussels Convention uses in Article 13 the same wording as the EC 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations 1980 (OJ C 
27/34, 26 January 1998). According to the Giuliano and Lagarde Report on 
this Convention it is intended to cover the situations of mail-order and doorstep 
selling. In a case of a mail-order selling the advertisement is carried out by 
the mailing of an offer to a consumer. By accepting the offer and placing an 
order the consumer takes in the State of his domicile the steps necessary for 
the conclusion of a contract. Hence, the conditions of Article 13 of the Brussels 
Convention are fulﬁlled. Furthermore, this Article is applicable in the case as
that of Mr Gabriel where he is seeking an order against a mail-order company 
established in another State to send him a prize that he had won. The prize is 
related to a contract that was concluded by the consumer. The mailing of the 
letter whereby the consumer is informed of the winning a prize, is send to him 
for the purpose of bringing him to place an order for goods. The EC Court held:
‘The jurisdiction rules set out in the Brussels Convention are to be construed as 
meaning that judicial proceedings by which a consumer seeks an order, in the 
Contracting State in which he is domiciled and pursuant to that State’s legislation, 
requiring a mail-order company established in another Contracting State to pay him 
a financial benefit in circumstances where that company had sent to that consumer 
in person a letter likely to create the impression that a prize would be awarded to 
him on condition that he ordered goods to a specified amount, and where that con-
sumer actually placed such an order in the State of his domicile without, however, 
21. See also IPRax 2003 23 note Leible, Rev. Crit. 2003 495 note Rémy-Corlay, Clunet 2003 
651 note Huet, NJ 2004 169 note Vlas.
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obtaining payment of that financial benefit, are contractual in nature in the sense 
contemplated in Article 13, first paragraph, point 3, of that Convention.’
Since in the present case the action is related to a consumer contract within 
the meaning of Article 13 of the Brussels Convention, the EC Court did not 
examine whether the action is of a contractual nature within the meaning of 
Article 5(1) of the Convention. The question arises whether the action would 
fall under Article 13 if the consumer would have required the payment of the 
prize he had won according to the offer, without having placed any order. 
This question has been answered by the Court of Justice in the Engler-ruling 
(C-27/02, not yet published in ECR). The Court ruled that Article 13 of the 
Brussels Convention is not applicable in the case where the consumer has not 
concluded the contract with the professional vendor yet. In the opinion of the 
Court legal proceedings by which a consumer seeks an order that a mail order 
company established in another Contracting State, awards a prize ostensibly 
won by him can be under circumstances of contractual nature for the purpose of 
Article 5(1) of the Convention, even though the consumer has not concluded a 
contract with the professional vendor. The Court sets out that Article 5(1) does 
not require the conclusion of a contract (see Case C-334/00, Tacconi v. Wagner, 
[2002] ECR I-7357, see supra para. 3).
Articles 13 to 15 of the Brussels Convention are inspired by the desire to 
protect only a certain group of persons. This means that the scope of applica-
tion of these Articles is to be interpreted restrictively. These Articles are not 
applicable in a case of a consumer organisation bringing an action against a 
professional party which is using general terms and conditions which are to 
be considered contrary to provisions of a certain State. Despite the fact that 
the national law establishing this organisation gives to this organisation the 
power to suit anyone who lays down in commercial dealings with consumers 
general terms and conditions which are contrary to the national law, it does 
not follow that Articles 13 to 15 of the Brussels Convention are applicable. An 
organisation which acts as an assignee of the rights of the private consumers 
cannot be regarded as a consumer (Case C-89/91, Shearson Lehmann Hutton v. 
TVB, [1993] ECR 139, NILR 1993 501 note Vlas). Although the possibility of 
bringing an action by a consumer organisation is founded on the law, it cannot 
be said that the Convention is not applicable (Case C-167/00, VKI v. Henkel, 
[2002] ECR I-8111).22 According to the settled case-law of the ECJ regarding 
the scope of the Convention, only the subject of the action in the main proceed-
ings matters (see supra para. 2). If the organisation is acting as an assignee, it 
does not exercise the public power, but it brings an action which derogates from 
the rules applicable to the relations between private bodies.
It is also settled case-law of the ECJ that Article 5(3) of the Convention 
covers all actions which seek to establish the liability of a defendant and are not 
22. See also IPRax 2003 223 note Michailidou, Rev. Crit. 2003 682 note Rémy-Corlay.
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relating to a contractual liability in the meaning of Article 5(1) of the Conven-
tion (Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Schröder, [1988] ECR 556, conﬁrmed by Tacconi 
v. Wagner, see supra para. 3). As in the case where an organisation for the 
protection of the rights of the consumers brings an action against a professional 
party, there is no contract between this organisation and the defendant, the juris-
diction of the court seised can only be based on Article 5(3) of the Convention. 
The concept of the term ‘place where the harmful event occurred’ covers not 
only cases where damages exist but also cases where there is no damage yet, but 
there is a possibility of occurring of the damage. This means that this concept 
does not presuppose the existence of the damage. In the VKI v. Henkel case 
the Court pointed out that this interpretation of Article 5(3) is conﬁrmed by the
wording of Article 5(3) of the ‘Brussels I’ Regulation according to which juris-
diction can be founded at the place where the harmful event occurred or may 
occur. 
6. LIS PENDENS AND RELATED ACTIONS
Under the Brussels Convention the possibilities of starting proceedings in the 
courts of more than one Contracting State are multiplied. Article 21 of the 
Convention (see Art. 27 ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) deals with lis pendens and 
adopts a solution for a situation where proceedings involving the same cause of 
action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of two different 
Contracting States. The court second seised has to stay the proceedings until the 
court ﬁrst seised establishes its jurisdiction. If this is the case, any other court
than the court ﬁrst seised should decline its jurisdiction. If related actions are
brought in the courts of different Contracting States, Article 22 of the Conven-
tion (see Art. 28 ‘Brussels I’ Regulation) provides that any other court than the 
court ﬁrst seised may stay the proceedings until the court ﬁrst seised establishes
its jurisdiction. On an application of one of the parties a court other than the 
court ﬁrst seised can decline its jurisdiction if it is permitted to do so by the
law of that court. The aim of Articles 21 and 22 is to avoid a conﬂict between
the decisions. These provisions have to preclude the situation where in accor-
dance with Article 27(3) of the Convention a judgment given by a court of one 
Contracting State cannot be recognised in another Contracting State because of 
the irreconcilability with a judgment given by a court in the Contracting State 
where the recognition is sought (Case 144/86, Gubisch v. Palumbo, [1987] ECR 
4861, NILR 1988 81 note Verheul). This is the reason why according to the 
case-law of the ECJ these Articles are to be interpreted broadly as to cover all 
situations of lis pendens before courts of the Contracting States (Case C-351/89, 
Overseas Union Insurance, [1991] ECR I-3317, NILR 1992 404 note Vlas, see 
also Case C-351/96, Drouot Assurance v. CMI, [1998] ECR I-3075). 
In Gantner v. Basch (Case C-111/01, [2003] ECR I-4207) Basch brought 
in a Dutch court an action against Gantner for payment of damages caused by 
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Gantner by terminating a contract between parties.23 Basch limited his claim 
by the deduction of a sum of a claim by Gantner which Basch considered to be 
justiﬁed. Before the Austrian court Gantner brought an action against Basch for
payment of the goods delivered to Basch. In the opinion of Basch the Gantner’s 
claim should have been dismissed as the justiﬁed portion of that claim had been
deducted from Basch’s claim before the Dutch court. Furthermore, Basch asked 
the Austrian court to stay the proceedings in accordance with Article 21 of the 
Brussels Convention on the ground of lis pendens or in accordance with Article 
22 of the Brussels Convention because the proceedings constituted related 
actions. The ECJ rendered that in order to determine whether the actions in this 
case have the same cause of action no account is to be taken of the grounds of 
defence raised by a defendant. The deduction of the Gantner’s claim by Basch 
has not been requested in the proceedings in the Dutch court. Basch has affected 
the deduction of the claim by an extra-judicial set-off. According to the Court’s 
ruling at the outset of the proceedings it is to be determined if Article 21 is 
applicable. If regard should be had to the defence grounds, the solution of lis 
pendens of Article 21 could be frustrated by the defendant. The EC Court held:
‘Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be construed as meaning that, in 
order to determine whether two claims brought between the same parties before 
the courts of different Contracting States have the same subject-matter, account 
should be taken only of the claims of the respective applicants, to the exclusion of 
the defence submissions raised by a defendant.’ 
In our opinion the ruling of the ECJ in Gantner v. Basch is correct. The respec-
tive claims are related to different periods of time. The Basch’s claim for 
damages caused by terminating of the contract by Gantner is related to a period 
of time after the contract between the parties is terminated. The Gantner’s claim 
for payment of the price of delivered goods is related to the contract itself, i.e., 
to the period of time before the termination of the contract between the parties. 
Hence, the actions are not related to the same cause of action. The recognition 
of a judgment of the Austrian court cannot be refused in the Netherlands by 
virtue of Article 27(3) of the Brussels Convention, because it is not irreconcil-
able with a judgment of the Dutch court on the Basch’s action. After all, the 
proceedings before the Dutch court does not involve the Gantner’s claim on 
price payment as this claim is deducted by Basch in an extra-judicial set-off and, 
for instance, not by a counterclaim of Gantner as a defence against Basch in the 
Dutch proceedings. As the consequences of the judgments from the Dutch and 
Austrian proceedings are not irreconcilable, Article 22 of the Brussels Conven-
tion is inapplicable. The actions are not related on the same grounds as there is 
no lis pendens in the meaning of Article 21 of the Convention.
23. See also IPRax 2003 426 note Reischl, Rev. Crit. 2003 551 note Pataut, Clunet 2004 
638 note Huet.
NILR_2005-1-30a.indd   125 4/14/2005   3:55:15 PM
P. VLAS, M. ZILINSKY AND F. IBILI126 NILR 2005
The question arises whether Articles 21 and 22 are applicable in a case 
where an action is brought in the courts of two Contracting States, whereas 
one of these courts has jurisdiction under an exclusive jurisdiction agreement 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Convention. In English legal practice 
Article 21 is not applicable if the court second seised is competent under Article 
17 of the Convention (Continental Bank v. Aekos, [1994] 1 WLR 588 (CA)).24 
If the parties entered a contract and agreed on an exclusive choice of forum, 
this forum has exclusive jurisdiction in the matters arising from this contract. 
Other courts do not longer have jurisdiction under the Convention, apart from 
jurisdiction under Article 16. In Gasser v. MISAT the ECJ decided that Article 
21 remains applicable even if the court second seised has jurisdiction under 
an exclusive choice of forum (Case C-116/02, not yet published in ECR).25 
Advocate-General Léger declared in his opinion that Article 21 of the Conven-
tion is not applicable if the court second seised has jurisdiction under a choice 
of forum clause, so it does not have to stay the proceedings. In the opinion of 
the EC Court Article 21 does not draw any distinction between the various 
heads of jurisdiction. There is a special position constituted by Article 19 of 
the Convention, but this Article is only applicable if one of the courts seised 
has an exclusive jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 16 of the Conven-
tion. The Court has pointed out that the parties can always invoke the choice of 
forum clause in the proceedings before the court which does not have jurisdic-
tion under the clause, and by virtue of this clause decline the jurisdiction of the 
court seised. By invoking the clause, the court seised can verify the existence 
of the clause and can declare that it does not have jurisdiction. According to the 
ECJ Article 21 remains applicable even if the proceedings in the courts of the 
Contracting State in which the court ﬁrst seised is established, are excessively
long. The derogating of Article 21 because of excessive delays in the proceed-
ings in that Contracting State would be contrary to the letter, the spirit and to 
the aim of the Convention. The Convention is based on mutual trust in the legal 
systems and judicial institutions of the Contracting States. The EC Court held in 
this respect:
‘Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that a court 
second seised whose jurisdiction has been claimed under an agreement confer-
ring jurisdiction must nevertheless stay proceedings until the court first seised has 
declared that it has no jurisdiction.
Article 21 of the Brussels Convention must be interpreted as meaning that it cannot 
be derogated from where, in general, the duration of proceedings before the courts 
of the Contracting State in which the court first seised is established is excessively 
long.’
24. See also P. Stone, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments in Europe (London, Longman 1998) 
p. 135.
25. See also IPRax 2004 205 note Grothe, Rev. Crit. 2004 444 note Muir Watt, Clunet 2004 
641 note Huet.
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If the ECJ would have decided according to the opinion that the court second 
seised is not obliged to stay proceedings if it has jurisdiction under a choice of 
forum clause, a problem could arise in case of enforcement of the judgment of 
the court ﬁrst seised in the Contracting State where the proceedings are pending
under the choice of forum clause. In accordance with Article 27(3) of the Brus-
sels Convention the recognition of the judgment of the court ﬁrst seised could
only be refused if this judgment would be irreconcilable with the judgment of 
the court which has jurisdiction under the choice of forum clause. If the court 
ﬁrst seised would render a judgment before the court in the State of enforce-
ment which has jurisdiction under the choice of forum clause, the recognition of 
the ﬁrst judgment cannot be refused according to Article 27(3) of the Conven-
tion. In our opinion the recognition of this judgment cannot even be refused 
according to Article 27(1) of the Convention. The recognition of the judgment 
is not contrary to the public policy of the State of enforcement. The notion 
‘public policy’ of Article 27(1) of the Convention is to be interpreted strictly 
and is only applicable if the recognition of a judgment from another Contracting 
State is manifestly contrary to the public policy (Case C-7/98, Krombach v. 
Bamberski, [2000] ECR I-1935, NILR 2002 133 note Zilinsky, see also Case 
C-38/98, Renault v. Maxicar, [2000] ECR I-2973). A judgment given in breach 
of a choice of forum clause is not contrary to the public policy, see also Article 
28(3) of the Brussels Convention which provides that the test of public policy 
may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction.
7. CONFLICTING JUDGMENTS 
Although it is the aim of Articles 21 and 22 of the Brussels Convention to 
prevent conﬂicting judgments from courts of the Contracting States, it still may
happen that a judgment of a court of a Contracting State is irreconcilable with a 
judgment of a court of another Contracting State. It is for example not clear yet 
if Article 21 is applicable if the plaintiff is applying for provisional matters in 
courts of two Contracting States or if one party applies for provisional matters 
in the court of one Contracting State and the opposite party applies in another 
State for provisional matters as well. It is out of a question that the proceedings 
are brought between the same parties. Because of the nature of a provisional 
matter it could be said that the proceedings do not have the same cause of the 
action. A provisional matter is meant to effect the situation in the State where 
it is rendered. Also in the situation when in one Contracting State the main 
proceedings are pending and in another State a provisional measure is asked for, 
it is not clear if Article 21 can be applied.
To prevent the recognition and enforcement of a judgment of a court of one 
Contracting State in another Contracting State where it would be irreconcilable 
with a judgment given in the latter State, Article 27(3) of the Brussels Conven-
tion provides that a judgment shall not be recognised if it is irreconcilable with 
a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State of enforce-
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ment. According to this Article it is not necessary that the judgments involve 
the same action. The judgment given in the State of enforcement does not have 
to fall within the scope of the Convention. It is the effect and the consequences 
of the judgments which have to conﬂict (Case 145/86, Hoffman v. Krieg, [1988] 
ECR 6450, NILR 1988 83 note Verheul).
In Italian Leather v. WECO (Case C-80/00, [2002] ECR I-4995) the ECJ 
rendered that if in one Contracting State a provisional matter is denied and in 
another Contracting State the same provisional matter is rendered, the judg-
ments concerning the provisional matters are irreconcilable within the meaning 
of Article 27(3) of the Convention.26 Italian Leather, a company domiciled in 
Italy, brought proceedings before a German court for provisional matters against 
WECO, a company domiciled in Germany. It had to restrain WECO from using 
the brand name of Italian Leather for marketing purposes. The German court 
dismissed the application for this provisional matter as there was no ground for 
granting such an order. Italian Leather has not proved that there was a possi-
bility of irreparable damages, which is one of the requirements for granting of 
provisional matters according to German law. A few days before the German 
court rendered its judgment, Italian Leather applied for a provisional matter in 
an Italian court. The Italian court had jurisdiction according to the choice of 
forum clause in the distribution contract between Italian Leather and WECO. 
Contrary to the German court the Italian court held that the requirements for 
granting of a provisional matter have been fulﬁlled. The court granted the asked
provisional matters restraining WECO from using the brand name of Italian 
Leather for distribution of products in several Member States. On the applica-
tion of Italian Leather the German court initially declared the judgment of the 
Italian court according to the provisions of the Brussels Convention enforce-
able in Germany. On appeal of WECO, the declaration of enforceability of the 
Italian judgment has been withdrawn on a ground that it is irreconcilable with 
an earlier German judgment denying the granting of a provisional matter. The 
German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) referred questions on the inter-
pretation of Article 27(3) to the ECJ. The EC Court observed that according to 
its case-law two judgments are irreconcilable if they entail legal consequences 
which are mutually exclusive. As Article 25 of the Convention refers to the term 
‘judgment’ and as the interim judgments are judgments within the meaning of 
this provision, the irreconcilability can exist between an interim judgment and a 
judgment given in the main proceedings. The irreconcilability lies in the effects 
of the judgments. The requirements of national law for granting of interim relief 
which can vary from one Contracting State to another, are irrelevant. The ECJ 
rendered that a foreign decision on interim measures ordering an obligor not 
to carry out certain acts is irreconcilable with a decision on interim measures 
refusing to grant such an order in a dispute between the same parties in the State 
where recognition is sought.
26. See also IPRax 2003 55 note Wolf & Lange, Rev. Crit. 2002 173 note Muir Watt.
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In our opinion, the irreconcilability of the judgments as it occurred in Italian 
Leather v. WECO, could be prevented if the Italian court as a court second 
seised would have stayed the proceedings on a ground of lis pendens (Art. 21 
of the Brussels Convention). The proceedings have been brought to this court 
whereas the proceedings concerning the same cause have been still pending 
in a German court. In this case the proceedings for the provisional matters 
involve the same cause of action, namely restraining of using the brand name 
by WECO for marketing purposes, and the proceedings are brought between 
the same parties. In the Italian proceedings as well as in the German proceed-
ings Italian Leather is the plaintiff and WECO is the defendant. Article 21 is 
however not applicable if the provisional matter would have been asked for in 
the main proceedings before the Italian court having jurisdiction as a chosen 
forum in the contract between the parties and this court would have been the 
court second seised. Only if the main proceedings are brought in the court ﬁrst
seised and in the second court interim relief is asked for, this provision is to be 
applied under the condition that the interim relief frustrates the decision in the 
main proceedings.27
It is to be mentioned that also under Article 34(3) of the ‘Brussels I’ Regula-
tion it is possible to deny recognition to a foreign judgment if it is irreconcilable 
with a judgment in the Member State of enforcement. Contrary to the Brussels 
Convention a granting of the declaration of enforceability can only be refused 
if an appeal against the declaration is lodged. The court seised may not test the 
foreign judgment on his own motion.
27. See P. Vlas NILR 2003 151 (156) in his note under Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) 
21 June 2002, Spray Network v. Telenor Venture.
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